La regla lógica que prohíbe inferir conclusiones morales o normativas desde premisas fácticas fue atribuida a David Hume por los primeros autores analíticos que se ocuparon de esta cuestión, llegando a ser conocida, esta regla, como la ley de Hume. Sin embargo, esta atribución ha sido fuertemente discutida desde entonces. El propósito de este trabajo es sistematizar los argumentos de esta discusión desde su origen -que se encuentra en un trabajo de A.C. MacIntyrehasta la intervención de J.M. Finnis, en razón (...) de que en tal período, aunque no se cierra la discusión en cuestión, quedan ya enunciados todos los problemas centrales que envuelve la interpretación del texto de Hume. (shrink)

Resumen Según autores como Grisez y Finnis, la teoría clásica de la ley natural es inmune a la crítica contenida en el argumento de la ley de Hume, porque aquella teoría no aspira a derivar la ética de la metafísica, ni los enunciados prácticos de enunciados fácticos. La autonomía de la razón práctica, sostienen estos autores, permite una explicación de la teoría de la ley natural que no exige ningún recurso a la metafísica o a cualquier otro conocimiento teórico de (...) la naturaleza. Esta tesis ha sido fuertemente discutida por autores vinculados al neo-tomismo que niegan la validez de la regla lógica expresada en la ley de Hume y, a la vez, afirman que la teoría tomista de la ley natural sólo se sostiene sobre sus fundamentos metafísicos. Esta discusión, sin embargo, es manifestativa de la equivocidad con que unos y otros han recibido la ley de Hume, y de la falta de análisis sobre sus supuestos y sobre el modo en que tales supuestos dialogan con la tradición clásica del iusnaturalismo.According to authors such as Grisez and Finnis, the classical theory of natural law is immune to the criticism contained in Hume’s law argument, because that theory does not pretend to derive ethics from metaphysics, nor practical statements from factual statements. These authors argue that the autonomy of practical reason allows an explanation of the theory of natural law, which does not require any recourse to metaphysics or any other theoretical knowledge of nature. This thesis has been strongly contested by authors linked to neo-Thomism, who deny the validity of the logical rule expressed in Hume’s law and, at the same time, affirm that the Thomistic theory of natural law can only be sustained on its metaphysical foundations. This discussion, however, is indicative of the ambiguity with which they have received Hume’s law, and of the lack of analysis on the assumptions of such law and on the way in which such assumptions dialogue with the classical tradition of natural law. (shrink)

This article is about the radical unity of natural law, and shows that, according to the thinking of Saint Thomas, the plurality of moral precepts can be adequately understood only in its light. In other words, any precept of natural law is a precept because it participates in the first principle. It follows that a division of the precepts into primary, secondary and tertiary precepts does not correspond to a schematic classification. The distinction of primary, secondary and tertiary precepts of (...) natural law is a relative distinction. (shrink)

A reflexão sobre a proximidade do pesquisador com seu objeto empírico de pesquisa, no caso as cenas musicais do rock independente de Porto Alegre e Montevidéu, surge a partir da noção de psicanálise do conhecimento objetivo, de Gaston Bachelard. Através de questionamentos teóricos críticos, o autor propõe a apreensão poética das realidades objetivas da pesquisa, onde a musicalidade é percebida como potencial metodológico no universo da observação participante.

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

Memory trace was originally a philosophical term used to explain the phenomenon of remembering. Once debated by Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno of Citium, the notion seems more recently to have become the exclusive province of cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists. Nonetheless, this modern appropriation should not deter philosophers from thinking carefully about the nature of memory traces. On the contrary, scientific research on the nature of memory traces can rekindle philosopher's interest on this notion. With that general aim in mind, the (...) present paper has three specific goals. First, it attempts to chart the most relevant philosophical views on the nature of memory traces from both a thematic and historical perspective. Second, it reviews critical findings in the psychology and the neuroscience of memory traces. Finally, it explains how such results lend support to or discredit specific philosophical positions on the nature of memory traces. This paper also touches upon the issues raised by recent empirical research that theories of memory traces need to accommodate in order to succeed. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo propone reinterpretar la noción de cuerpo en la filosofia de Nietzsche contrastada con dos perspectivas relevantes de los estudios nietzscheanos en habla hispana: primero, la idea de que el cuerpo es sinónimo de naturaleza; y segundo, la idea de que el cuerpo es causa del sujeto. Pasando la mirada sobre una parte de la obra -publicada e inédita- de Nietzsche posterior al año 1885, se observa que la noción de cuerpo funge el papel de una metodologia que (...) permite llevar a cabalidad una renovada tarea de su filosofia, a saber, la tarea de conocerse a si mismo. Asi, la noción de cuerpo en Nietzsche, más allá de ser un concepto innovador o reivindicado, es una herramienta interpretante que le permite al autor establecer nuevas dimensiones "entre" el conocer y la experimentación corporal. ABSTRACT This paper proposes a re-interpretation of the idea of Body in Nietzsche's philosophy to distinguish it from two important perspectives of Nietzsche-studies in Spanish: The first one maintains that the Body is comparable with Nature, and the second one, states that the Body is a cause of subjectivity. Analyzing part of Nietzsche's work after 1885 -published and unpublished- shows that the idea of the Body works as a methodology that allows Nietzsche to accomplish a new task of his philosophy, such as the task of self-knowledge. In this way, the Body in Nietzsche's philosophy, besides being an innovative and redeemable concept, is a performative tool that establishes new dimensions "in-between" human knowing and bodily experimentation. (shrink)

BREVE RELATO DE UMA OUTRA EXPERIÊNCIA EDUCACIONAL: O ENSINO JURÍDICO NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS.

Within New Testament writings, but in a special way in Paul’s letters, we can observe a significant presence of the greek term parresía, or frank language. This term was not only a rhetorical-linguistic instrument, on Paul’s contemporary time, but an attitude made by the speaker, or by the epistolar author before his recipients. On Eph 6,19, we see this term and its relation with the evangelizing mission of the author. Moreover, this concept was not only a linguistic function for Paul’s (...) writings and time actions, but it can have an effectiveness in present time. (shrink)

For the past three decades there has been a substantial amount of scientific evidence supporting the view that attention is necessary and sufficient for perceptual representations to become conscious (i.e., for there to be something that it is like to experience a representational perceptual state). This view, however, has been recently questioned on the basis of some alleged counterevidence. In this paper we survey some of the most important recent findings. In doing so, we have two primary goals. The first (...) is descriptive: we provide a literature review for those seeking an understanding of the present debate. The second is editorial: we suggest that the evidence alleging dissociations between consciousness and attention is not decisive. Thus, this is an opinionated overview of the debate. By presenting our assessment, we hope to bring out both sides in the debate and to underscore that the issues here remain matters of intense controversy and ongoing investigation. (shrink)

Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against such intuitions. Particularly, our studies (...) of folk intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are described in neurological terms, they are not found to be any more exculpatory than when described in psychological terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even for actions that are fully neurologically caused. (shrink)

People frequently entertain counterfactual thoughts, or mental simulations about alternative ways the world could have been. But the perceived plausibility of those counterfactual thoughts varies widely. The current article interfaces research in the philosophy and semantics of counterfactual statements with the psychology of mental simulations, and it explores the role of perceived similarity in judgments of counterfactual plausibility. We report results from seven studies (N = 6405) jointly supporting three interconnected claims. First, the perceived plausibility of a counterfactual event is (...) predicted by the perceived similarity between the possible world in which the imagined situation is thought to occur and the actual world. Second, when people attend to differences between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as less similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as less plausible. Lastly, when people attend to what is identical between imagined possible worlds and the actual world, they think of the imagined possible worlds as more similar to the actual world and tend to judge counterfactuals in such worlds as more plausible. We discuss these results in light of philosophical, semantic, and psychological theories of counterfactual thinking. (shrink)

Este artigo se dedica ao conceito de consciência, ou melhor, de chamado da consciência, tal como delineado por Heidegger na segunda seção de Ser e Tempo. Ao mesmo tempo em que se mostra como um conceito intransponível para a compreensão da condição de autenticidade do ente Dasein, a discussão sobre a consciência também estabelece a relação de Heidegger com a tradição fenomenológica de maneira mais abrangente, como ruptura de um fluxo interpretativo e sedimentação de uma nova acepção. A noção de (...) esquecimento aqui não mais se aplica ao problema da história da metafísica em relação à pergunta fundamental pelo ser, mas à autocompreensão do Dasein como ente aberto a uma temporalidade finita, já que nos empreendimentos inerentes à vida cotidiana, esse ente degenera-se na impessoalidade, no “a-gente” – por meio do qual instaura-se a inautenticidade. Eis, pois, o horizonte interpretativo em que se instaura o problema da consciência em Ser e Tempo, que compreende uma das principais fontes para a abordagem do tema no pensamento de Martin Heidegger. (shrink)

Em _Origens do Totalitarismo_, Hannah Arendt faz uma caracterização do totalitarismo como uma forma de governo inédita, fincada em duas novas camadas sociais, a ralé e as massas. Sua descrição do totalitarismo é realizada a partir de uma diferenciação com a tirania. Este trabalho buscou observar como o surgimento dos supracitados grupos sociais permitiram o surgimento dessa nova forma de governo. Vimos que a definição dela de povo diferencia-se da tradicional, quando afirma ser o povo diretamente relacionado à busca de (...) um sistema verdadeiramente representativo. Esta diferenciação é realizada em relação a dois grupos sociais, a ralé, que é composta do refugo da sociedade capitalista, dos _declassés_, daqueles que não encontram representação no sistema político, e que é também subproduto da burguesia, não se desligando desta, e as massas, que são formadas pelas pessoas desarticuladas e isoladas, neutras, indiferentes politicamente, atomizadas, supérfluas, resultantes de um mundo destruído. Para a autora, o totalitarismo emerge quando líderes da ralé passam a ser a força motriz das massas. O totalitarismo é mostrado como o criador de um simulacro da realidade, que aproveitou-se do esvaziamento do espaço público, começando a diferenciar-se da tirania pelo terror pós-eliminação da oposição, pelo líder ser parte da engrenagem e instrumento de desresponsabilização, por não se separar da propaganda, por seu amorfismo e pelo fato do campo de concentração ser o espelho e a miniatura da sociedade almejada. (shrink)

The expression “repressed memory” was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud’s seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked—yet the term “repressed memory” seems to remain. In this paper I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have (...) either survived scientific change—such as “atom” or “gene”—or that have perished, such as “black bile”. Ultimately, I argue that “repressed memory” is more like “black bile” than “atom” or “gene” and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary. (shrink)

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models (...) of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond lowlevel sensory representations while also falling short of more sophisticated intellectual abilities. (shrink)

Recent evidence suggests that if a deterministic description of the events leading up to a morally questionable action is couched in mechanistic, reductionistic, concrete and/or emotionally salient terms, people are more inclined toward compatibilism than when those descriptions use non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic, abstract and/or emotionally neutral terms. To explain these results, it has been suggested that descriptions of the first kind are processed by a concrete cognitive system, while those of the second kind are processed by an abstract cognitive system. The (...) current paper reports the results of three studies exploring whether or not considerations about possible future consequences of holding an agent responsible at a present time affect people’s judgments of responsibility. The results obtained suggest first that the concrete system does not produce compatibilist judgments of responsibility unconditionally, even when facing appropriately mechanistic, reductionistic, emotionally loaded and concretely worded deterministic scenarios. Second, these results suggest that considerations about possible future consequences for innocent third parties that may follow as a result of holding an agent responsible affect people’s judgment as to whether or not the agent is responsible for what she did. Finally, it is proposed that these results compliment extant evidence on the so-called “Side-effect effect”, as they suggest that emotional reactions toward possible future side effects influence people’s judgment of responsibility. The impact of these results for philosophy and moral psychology is discussed. (shrink)

State-of-the-art collection on how neuroscience and philosophy can mutually illuminate each other on core psychological concepts. An interdisciplinary collection in the best sense.

RESUMEN Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría. ABSTRACT Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose (...) symptoms include disorders or impairments of consciousness. Unfortunately, the meaning of the term consciousness is not altogether clear. This article presents a systematic review of various meanings attributed to this term, as well as of diverse associated philosophical problems. Likewise, it reconstructs some philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness, identifying their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, it offers some suggestions for the use of the term consciousness in psychiatry. (shrink)

Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo analisar o conhecimento teórico de conselhos tutelares sobre o Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente e suas atuações a partir disso. Para isso, realizamos entrevistas com dois conselhos por meio de um questionário. As respostas foram dadas por escrito e, com elas, pudemos notar convergências e divergências entre esses conselhos. Com a análise, percebemos que cada conselho possui um olhar no seu trabalho, porém ambos possuem consciência de que seu dever é o de proteger e (...) garantir os direitos das crianças e dos adolescentes. Ambos os conselhos admitiram existir interação com a escola, porém, ela se restringe ao controle de frequência e da evasão escolar. Também, ambos remetem casos de violação de direitos à realidade social, afirmando que fatores econômicos não são determinantes nesses atos, porém, nos casos de famílias em situações econômicas desfavoráveis, o conselho tutelar é acionado. Por fim, enquanto um dos conselhos diz que aquele que viola algum direito da criança ou do adolescente deve ser responsabilizado, outro afirma que ele deve intervir com medidas educativas para resgatas a proteção do menor. Concluímos que os conselhos conhecem seus deveres, porém deixam a desejar no que tange à relação com as escolas. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack propose a two-system account of temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic proposals where cognitive systems are putatively independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a minimum, involve a difference in the nature of the representations upon which each system operates, and a difference in the computations they carry out. In this comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's proposal does not meet the minimal requirements and.

La presente investigación busca analizar la implementación de estrategias gamificadas en el modelo de gestión del conocimiento a nivel organizacional. Como metodología se realizó una revisión literaria mediante el análisis de la identificación y transmisión del conocimiento, medios y tecnología, toma de decisiones, cultura organizacional y competencia. Se obtuvo 50 artículos sobre el uso de la gamificación y la gestión del conocimiento. Los resultados identifican sus aportes en la apropiación, socialización y transferencia del conocimiento, en el capital humano. Finalmente, se (...) identifica que la gamificación facilita los procesos relacionados con el modelo de gestión del conocimiento en las organizaciones. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é analisar os argumentos de Jean-François Lyotard a respeito do filosofar enquanto transformação na obra intitulada Por que filosofar? Lyotard publicou esse livro em 1989, constituído por quatro conferências proferidas em 1964 intituladas i. Por que desejar?, ii. Filosofia e Origem; iii. Sobre a palavra filosófica e iv. Sobre filosofia e ação, durante a fase em que foi marxista crítico nos anos 60 e 70. Em 1986 Lyotard afirma que foi atacado injustamente por ter mudado sua (...) posição política a partir da publicação de 1971, a qual marca a ruptura em sua obra, intitulada Discurso, Figura, onde analisa o que é a figura e o que é o figural/figurativo. (shrink)

Las ideas filosóficas del ámbito de la actividad física suelen estar sustentadas en concepciones que trascienden la propia disciplina de estudio aludida, de modo que es importante estudiarlas en profundidad. Este ensayo tiene por objetivo comprender la interpretación de los términos movimiento humano y motricidad humana desde la mirada de tres corrientes filosóficas que han sido utilizadas por referentes de la actividad física, el deporte y la Educación Física. La primera corriente filosófica analizada es la de corte idealista, que entiende (...) el movimiento humano como un acto esencialmente mecánico y biológico. La segunda perspectiva filosófica es la materialista, que entiende el movimiento humano como una manifestación de la motricidad, la cual sería inmanente a la esencia del ser humano. Es decir, estaría dotada de intencionalidad. La tercera corriente sería una mirada ecléctica de las dos anteriores, asemejando el concepto de movimiento humano con el de las contemporáneas interpretaciones de motricidad. En otras palabras, el movimiento humano sería parte de la potencia y el acto. Se concluye que, según diferentes perspectivas filosóficas, es posible utilizar el concepto de movimiento y/o motricidad para trascender la mirada idealista o moderna del movimiento humano. (shrink)